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One Nation’s Humanitarian Intervention is
Another’s Illegal Aggression: How to Govern
International Responsibility in the Face of
Civilian Suffering
ALEXANDRA T. STEELE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2011, a civilian uprising demanding governmental
reform and the displacement of longtime leader Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi emerged in Libya.1 By mid-February, Qaddafi had instituted a
regime of military force and violence in opposition to the uprising.2 In
Tripoli, the military used gunfire to “disperse thousands of protestors
who streamed out of mosques after prayers” and mounted a challenge to
the government’s crackdown.3 Quickly, what appeared to be an
organized core of antigovernment opponents emerged and the rebel
army asserted itself as an alternative to Qaddafi’s rule.4 By the end of
February, the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) unanimously
adopted Resolution 1970, condemning violence and human rights
violations, calling the Resolution “a vital step—a clear expression of the
will of a united community of nations.”5 On March 1, 2011, the United
* J.D., Loyola Law School, 2013. B.A., University of Southern California. The author would like
to thank Professor Yxta Murray for her assistance and encouragement as well as the Loyola of
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review.
1. Alan Cowel, Protests Take Aim at Leader of Libya, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 16, 2011),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/world/middleeast/17libya.html?_r=0.
2. Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirpatrick, Gaddafi Makes Surprise Appearance as Protests
Continue, NDTV (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/gaddafi-makes-surpriseappearance-as-protests-continue-87975.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Press Release, Security Council, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes
Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on
Protesters, U.N. Press Release SC/10187 (Feb. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Tough Measures on Libyan
Regime], available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10187.doc.htm.

99

100

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:99

States Senate adopted Resolution 85, which further condemned violence
and human rights violations, called on Qaddafi to desist from violence,
and called on the UNSC to institute a no-fly zone over Libyan territory.6
By mid–March, others in the Muslim world including the African
Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Council of
the League of Arab States, joined in condemning Libya and urged
imposition of a no-fly zone.7
Qaddafi failed to comply with Resolution 1970. In response, the
UNSC passed Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly
zone over Libya and empowering member states to take “all necessary
measures” to enforce the ban.8 Once again, Qaddafi failed to comply.9
On March 19th, 2011, the United States, in conjunction with NATO
members, launched an air strike to enforce Resolution 1973.10
As NATO, member states, and the Libyan rebels advanced against
Qaddafi, and the toppling of the Qaddafi regime appeared imminent,
post-intervention criticism of NATO and the UNSC emerged.11 While
many Westerners rejoiced at the end of Qaddafi’s rule and saw it as an
end to crimes against humanity, others saw NATO and U.S.
involvement in Libya as nothing more than the advancement of a
Western political and policy agenda.12
Questions rise to the surface: was NATO’s mission in Libya really
humanitarian in nature, or was it an inappropriate intervention in a
sovereign state’s civil war? If the latter, was this not a violation of
international law, and in particular, the UN Charter? How does NATO
decide which parts of the world qualify for their “humanitarian
intervention” missions? If NATO will enter Libya to protect civilian
human rights, why was the same not done for Syria? If violations of the
UN Charter have taken place, as well as potential war crimes in the
6. Caroline D. Krass, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 1
(2011), available at http://justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf.
7. Id.
8. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya,
Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilian, By Vote of 10 in Favour with 5
Abstentions,
U.N.
Doc.
SC/10200
(Mar.
17,
2011),
available
at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sr10200.com.htm#Resolution.
9. Louis Charbonneau, No Sign Gaddafi Complying with UN Demands: Ban, THOMSON
REUTERS,
Mar.
25,
2011,
available
at
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE72O02E20110325?sp=true.
10. Curtis Doebbler, The Use of Force Against Libya: Another Illegal Use of Force, JURIST
(Mar. 20, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/03/the-use-of-force-against-libya-another-illegaluse-of-force.php.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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perpetration of “humanitarian intervention,” what are the available
remedies?13 Finally, if there are no remedial measures in instances of
violation, have the UNSC and NATO permanently expanded and
redefined the “peace and security” exception of the UN Charter with
regard to the use of force?
This Note will argue that the “peace and security” exception that
justified the use of force in Libya and, in particular, its “humanitarian”
sub-exception, not only sets a dangerous precedent, but also violates
international law. Part I will set forth the history and the exceptions to
the use of force in the UN Charter specifically focusing on
“humanitarian intervention” and its newer, controversial form, the
“Responsibility to Protect.” Part II will address whether the
Responsibility to Protect, before and after its implementation in Libya,
is an emerging norm of customary international law. Part III discusses
the inherently political nature of decisions to use military force, in
particular how the international community decides to use military force
only in select countries. In the case of Libya and Syria, political and
policy agendas clearly are at the core of that decision despite the UN
Charter’s express prohibition against such rationale. In particular, the
article will examine the specific acts of NATO and member states that
tend to show that the use of force is being used to advance a political
and policy agenda, in direct contradiction of the requirements of the UN
Charter.
Part IV lays out the impact of the Libya intervention on the UNSC,
and the UN Charter’s prohibition against the use of force. Further, the
Note argues that revelations surrounding the Libyan intervention pose
particular challenges to the legitimacy of the Responsibility to Protect
doctrine, and that in its current form, it threatens to render the Charter’s
prohibition against the use of force irrelevant.
Part V proposes remedial measures that delineate and set
boundaries on actions taken under the Responsibility to Protect. These
measures would prevent its use as cover by NATO member states to
advance their own agendas as opposed to serving the doctrine’s true
purpose to mitigate humanitarian crisis. The remedial measures
proposed focus on using the tools of the International Criminal Court,
13. Elena Papadopoulou, The Impact of SC Res. 1970/2011 on the Obligation of UN
Member States Under the Rome Statute and Some Reflections on the Immunities of Libyan
Officials, 27 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 731 (2011). While many parties to the UN Charter are
subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), some members, in
particular the United States, are not.
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the International Court of Justice, and the veto power of UNSC voting
members.
This Note will conclude that the UN Charter has been violated for
the following reasons: (1) the Charter requires that members refrain
from intervening in matters that are primarily domestic (i.e. civil war)
yet NATO’s Libyan intervention has done just that; (2) the lack of factfinding to determine violations of the UNSC Resolutions and human
rights prior to NATO’s military campaign in the region provides
insufficient affirmation that the use of force was a measure of last
resort; and lastly, (3) NATO took the side of the rebels, thus advancing
a political agenda in direct violation of the Charter. For these reasons,
the Libyan intervention cannot be justified under the Responsibility to
Protect. Finally, in order to maintain the integrity of the UN Charter, the
UN’s political and judicial organs, and the legal standing of the
Responsibility to Protect, the international legal community must
develop measures that instill strict limits on further authorization and
discharge of military intervention under the peace and
security/humanitarian exception to the long standing jus cogens
prohibiting the use of force.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE USE OF FORCE
A. The Prohibition Against the Use of Force
The United Nations Charter, created in 1945, sets out specific
guidelines and principles for its members.14 Specifically, Article 2(4)
prohibits the use of force to advance political or policy agendas, “or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”15 This prohibition is binding “on states both individually and
as members of international organizations, such as NATO, as well as on
those organizations themselves.”16 Further, Article 2(7) provides that
nothing in the UN Charter “shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction
of any state.”17
The UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of force carries with it the
14. Charter of the United Nations: Introductory Note, UNITED NATIONS, available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/intro.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
15. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
16. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L.
1, 3 (1999).
17. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
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norm of jus cogens – “a principle having status of such a peremptory
norm” of general international law.18 This is supported “most notably in
the Nicaragua judgment of the International Court of Justice” (“ICJ”) in
which the ICJ based its decision on customary international law naming
the prohibition of the use of force as a “fundamental or cardinal
principle of such law.”19 Additional judicial organs have analyzed the
use of force such as the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.20
The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea held that “the use of
force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force is
unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in
the circumstances.”21
B. Exceptions to the Use of Force
Under the UN Charter, the use of force is only permitted in two
instances.22 The first exception to the prohibition against the use of force
is self-defense.23 A second, more recently emerging, exception allows
the use of force when necessary to maintain “peace and security.”24
From 1990 to 1994, the UNSC considered and passed twice as many
resolutions as it had in its entire history on what constituted threats to
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
thus expanding it to include humanitarian concerns.25
1. Humanitarian Intervention
The “peace and security” exception that now arguably includes the
protection of humanitarian interests was, and remains, quite
controversial.26 The humanitarian intervention exception to the
18. NICO SCHRIJVER, Challenges to the Prohibition To Use Force: Does the Straitjacket of
Article 2(4) UN Charter Begin to Gall Too Much?, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF
FORCE – THEORY AND REALITY – A NEED FOR CHANGE? 31, 39 (Niels Blokker & Nico
Schrijver, eds., Martinus NijHoff Publishers, 2005).
19. Id.; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 125, ¶ 243 (June 27).
20. SCHRIJVER, supra note 18, at 40.
21. Id.
22. Simma, supra note 16, at 3.
23. Id.
24. Richard Falk, Preliminary Libyan Scorecard: Acting Beyond the U.N. Mandate, CITIZEN
PILGRIMAGE (Sept. 6, 2011), http://richardfalk.wordpress.com/2011/09/06/preliminary-libyanscorecard-acting-beyond-the-un-mandate/.
25. Rebecca J. Hamilton, Note, The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine –
But What of Implementation?, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289–97 (2006).
26. Id.
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prohibition of the use of force is a tangled web – many argue that the
use of force for humanitarian purposes should not be denied in cases
where genuine action is needed.27 Yet “the doctrine is prone to abuse for
other than humanitarian purposes.”28 The “humanitarian” peace and
security exception itself has been called a violation of international law
because while humanitarian intervention “may be an ‘emerging norm,’
it is not yet an established principle of international law.”29 In the ICJ’s
ruling on U.S. military activities in Nicaragua during the 1980s, the
court declared, “the use of force could not be the appropriate method to
monitor or ensure such respect [for human rights].”30 Following the
ICJ’s issuance of its decision in Nicaragua, the United Kingdom
Foreign Office commented on unauthorized ‘humanitarian
intervention,’ noting, “its doubtful benefits would be heavily
outweighed by its costs in terms of respect for international law.”31
The resistance to “humanitarian intervention” has its basis in the
UN Charter itself as an instrument of decolonization – extending the
notion of sovereign equality.32 The resulting legal order represents a
formal commitment to anti-colonial nationalism, self-determination, and
to the protection of human rights.33 Critics argue that to use human
rights as the justification for military intervention of allegedly sovereign
states is to “betray” the original purpose of the Charter, allowing for and
protecting the equality of individual states, and is a new form of
imperial domination.34
Critics of intervention further claim that the use of force in the
name of humanitarianism is not truly aimed at protecting human rights,
but rather about pushing a political or policy agenda.35 Interventions
undertaken in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and
Kosovo have led many “to posit the emergence of a challenge to the

27. Id.
28. SCHRIJVER, supra note 18, at 39
29. Craig Martin, The Legal Implications of Military Intervention in Libya, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/craig-martin/the-legal-implicationsof_b_830089.html.
30. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 134–35 (June 27).
31. Simma, supra note 16, at 5.
32. ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 19–20 (James Crawford, et. al. eds., 2003).
33. Id. at 43.
34. Id.
35. Falk, supra note 24.
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assumed inviolability of state sovereignty.”36 A report issued by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(“ICISS”) identifies the different tensions at play in the debate on
intervention:
For some, the international community is not intervening enough; for
others it is intervening much too often. For some, the only real issue
is in ensuring that coercive interventions are effective; for others,
questions about legality, process and the possible misuse of
precedent loom much larger. For some, the new interventions herald
a new world in which human rights trump state sovereignty; for
others, it ushers in a world in which big powers ride roughshod over
the smaller ones, manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and
37
human rights.

A compelling narrative, principally characterized by its
“humanitarianism,” justifies intervention in sovereign states. This
humanitarian narrative, equipped with traditional storytelling tools, and
further embellished by the media – through photos, news bites and
punditry - has succeeded in presenting a convincing story that appeals to
deeply engrained Western ideologies of democracy and good and evil.38
This narrative is primarily heroic in nature,39 calling forth stories of
“rogue states, ruthless dictators and ethnic tensions as threats to the
established liberal international order.”40 Those peddling intervention
craftily paint the UNSC as a benevolent patriarch41 or UN peace-keepers
as the “[k]night in [w]hite [a]rmour.”42
Despite arguments against the practice of humanitarian
intervention, the narrative of justification has won. International law has
arguably been broken at least twice since Nicaragua. Military force was
used without UNSC authorization prior to humanitarian intervention in
both Kosovo and Iraq.43 In the 1999 Kosovo conflict, for example,
NATO justified intervention by relying on widely accepted norms
36. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 289.
37. Max W. Matthews, Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: The
Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 137, 140
(2008) (quoting ICISS Report).
38. See ORFORD, supra note 32.
39. Id. at 158.
40. Id. at 164.
41. Id. at 167.
42. See CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY, KNIGHTS IN WHITE ARMOUR: THE NEW ART OF WAR
AND PEACE (1997) (discussing UN peace-keepers in the “new world order.”).
43. Id.; Abraham D. Sofaer, The International Court of Justice and Armed Conflict, 1 NW. J.
INTL. HUM RTS. 4 (2004).
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incorporated in treaties such as the Genocide Convention, the Laws of
War, and the Geneva Convention.44 Both the interventions in Kosovo
and Iraq were supported by NATO’s moral authority but conspicuously
lacked legal authority.45 Legal commentators abashedly duck their
heads, rationalizing the illegality of humanitarian intervention by
arguing that “hard cases” do occur, and these hard cases leave state
actors no choice but to act outside the law.46 Furthermore, these
circumventions of the international law proscription on the use of force
have not, as of yet, led to repercussions of any sort.47
Former Secretary General Kofi Annan delivered a convincing
blow to the state sovereignty argument in his Millennium Report of
2000 when he rebuffed the notion that intervention is tantamount to
meddling with a state’s internal affairs.48 Annan asked: “if humanitarian
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and
systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our
common humanity?”49
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo further
highlighted the tension between legality, the need for protection of
human rights through intervention, and the use of force. It concluded
that NATO’s use of force against Serbia was “‘illegal, but
legitimate.’”50 Given the level of dissent by critics of intervention in
places like Kosovo, and the failed attempts at intervention in places like
Rwanda, it became clear that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
was due for a facelift. Without a serious re-thinking of the
interventionist approach, the humanitarian justification could not be
codified in international law.51
The convincing and now prevailing voices favoring intervention
for humanitarian reasons reframed concepts of sovereignty and started
44. Soafer, supra note 43, ¶ 17.
45. Id. ¶ 19.
46. ORFORD, supra note 32, at 164.
47. Falk, supra note 24, at 4–5.
48. U.N. Secretary General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st
Century: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 48, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Sept. 6–8, 2000) [hereinafter
United Nations, We the Peoples].
49. Id.
50. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT:
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000).
51. Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, FOREIGN AFF.
(Nov.–Dec. 2002), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58437/gareth-evans-and-mohamedsahnoun/the-responsibility-to-protect.
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to develop a potentially more palatable doctrine.52 Instances of illegal
but justified violations of international law would now be delineated,
and defined in an acceptable manner. A new prism through which to
address these issues and attempt – or, at least appear – to act in
compliance with international law was conceived. Thus came the
introduction of the Responsibility to Protect.53
2. The Responsibility to Protect
In 2001, international rights leaders affiliated with the ICISS,
issued a report on the Responsibility to Protect. The report was intended
to reconcile the many problems with humanitarian intervention, define
the international community’s responsibilities in the face of crimes
against humanity, and formulate a legal and humane framework for
when and how intervention should be implemented.54 In 2005, at the
60th session of the UN General Assembly, the member states
“unanimously endorsed” the Responsibility to Protect.55 The
Responsibility to Protect requires member states to protect the world’s
populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity” which “are deemed to be part of international jus
cogens.”56
The framers of the doctrine argued that the Responsibility to
Protect is foundationally “consistent with the core claims of
sovereignty.”57 Fundamental to the notion of State sovereignty is a
responsibility of the State itself to protect the people of the State.58
When a population is suffering from crimes due to internal conflict, and
the State is unable, or unwilling, to protect them, the principle (and law)
52. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY
(2001) (hereinafter ICISS Report).
53. See id.
COALITION,
54. History
and
Timeline
of
R2P,
R2P
http://r2pcoalition.org/content/view/22/48/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
55. Id.
56. Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Cote d’Ivoire,
Libya, and the Responsibility to Protect, 87 INT’L. AFFAIRS 824, 827 (2011) (discussing the
international society’s response to the humanitarian crises in Libya and the Cote d’Ivoire and the
new politics of protection that has developed over the past decade); Ekkehard Strauss, A Bird in
the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 25, 49, (Alex J. Bellamy, Sara E. Davies & Luke Glanville eds., 2011).
57. Edward C. Luck, Sovereignty, Choice and the Responsibility to Protect, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 14, 17 (Alex J. Bellamy et al. eds.,
2011).
58. Int’l Commission On Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect,
Rep. (Dec. 2001) (hereinafter ICISS Report).
TO PROTECT
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of non-intervention should “[yield] to the international responsibility to
protect.”59 Proponents of intervention claim that the issue of State
sovereignty would be moot unless a State was to insist it had a right to
commit humanitarian crimes against its people.60 Only in these
instances, where the claim of sovereignty is illegitimate and illegal,
might a State interfere. Sovereignty “need not pose a barrier, legally or
politically, for Responsibility to Protect.”61 Others take a stronger
position, suggesting that the Responsibility to Protect stands for the
proposition that national governments do not possess an absolute right
of sovereignty. Rather, that right is earned.62
In 2001, the ICISS and the UN High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change Report outlined the factors to consider in
making the decision to intervene.63 The responsibility to use coercive
military measures only arises when prevention and other coercive but
non-military measures fail.64 Security Council authorization of military
action is only considered in extreme circumstances or for “just cause.”65
Just cause is defined as the “large scale loss of life . . . which is a
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to
act . . . or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’ . . . carried out by killing, forced
expulsion, acts of terror or rape.”66 When these situations present
themselves, the Responsibility to Protect requires sufficient evidence
and facts to warrant intervention.67
Where there is cause, but before the Security Council authorizes
intervention, it must also consider several additional factors: (1) the
seriousness of the threat, (2) whether the action would be undertaken for
the proper purpose, (3) whether military action is the last resort, (4)
whether the action proposed is proportional, and (5) whether the
consequences of military action outweigh the benefits.68 The
59. Id.
60. Luck, supra note 57, at 17.
61. Id.
62. Michael Contarino & Selena Lucent, Stopping the Killing: The International Criminal
Court and Juridical Determination of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 193, 196 (Alex J. Bellamy et al. eds., 2011).
63. ICISS Report, supra note 58, at 32.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 29, 32; see also U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, Rep. of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change, U.N. Doc A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. High-Level Report].
66. ICISS Report, supra note 58, at 32.
67. Id. at 34.
68. U.N. High-level Report, supra note 65, at 67.

2012]

How to Govern International Responsibility

109

Responsibility to Protect comes with the post-intervention obligation to
ensure that the problems that provoked intervention do not recur or
resurface.69 The development of this specific framework has paved the
way for the Responsibility to Protect to become international law.
III. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AS AN EMERGING NORM
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW PRIOR
TO NATO’S INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
The ICJ defines customary law as “the general practice accepted as
law.”70 “[C]ustomary law may come into existence by virtue of State
practice, which entails elements of consistency of practice, generality of
practice and duration, as well as opinio juris.”71 Gareth Evans, the main
author of the Responsibility to Protect ICISS report, stated, “There is
not yet a sufficiently strong basis to claim the emergence of . . .
something as formal as a new principle of customary international
law.”72 Furthermore, “while the original ICISS report did not explicitly
call for legal reform to enshrine [Responsibility to Protect], the
Commissioners did leave the impression that international morality and
international law should be more closely aligned.”73 Evans’ statement
reflects the hope of the proponents of the humanitarian concept that the
Responsibility to Protect will in fact become international law.74 Some
argue that the newly labeled Responsibility to Protect, and the nonbinding general assembly document may satisfy the opinio juris
requirement.75 Other dedicated champions of the Responsibility to
Protect go a step further and say that the concept, even prior to Libya,
backed with the “custom” of humanitarian intervention, is already an
emerging norm.76 Yet, humanitarian intervention was never a legally
fortified doctrine.77 It follows then that the Responsibility to Protect is
not international law.78
69. ICISS Report, supra note 58, at 39.
70. Olof Leps, Responsibility to Protect: A Political Norm or a Customary Law?, PUB.
POL’Y & L. EU (Jun. 23, 2010), http://quovadiseurope.blogspot.com/2010/06/responsibility-toprotect-political.html (citing the Statute of the International Court of Justice (San Francisco, June
26, 1945)).
71. ICISS Report, supra note 58, at 39.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 135.
75. Leps, supra note 70.
76. Matthews, supra note 37, at 147–48.
77. Leps, supra note 70.
78. Id.
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The main factor that prevents the Responsibility to Protect from
becoming customary law is the inconsistency with which humanitarian
intervention has been practiced.79 Military operations have often
commenced without UNSC authorization—for example, “the 1999
NATO aggression against Serbia in the Kosovo conflict was
unauthorized, illegal and ‘condemned by China, Russia, and India.”80 As
consistency and state practice are requirements for customary law,
global condemnation of these recent interventions on the grounds of
humanitarian crisis weigh against the grant of such status.81 So at this
point, the Responsibility to Protect remains a mere suggestion, and
intervention in Libya on this basis is still arguably illegal. The
implications of the Libyan intervention on the Responsibility to
Protect’s progress toward customary international law will be discussed
below.
IV. THE INHERENTLY POLITICAL NATURE
OF DECIDING WHERE TO INTERVENE
At first glance, the 2011 situation in Libya appeared to be a case
for international humanitarian intervention.82 Though Qaddafi was
waging war against Libyans,83 Mary Ellen O’Connell, critic of the
Responsibility to Protect, argued that it was unclear whether the
doctrine’s requirement of just cause was truly met.84 When the bombing
in Libya began, Western leaders compared the situation in Libya to
Rwanda and Bosnia. O’Connell made the distinction; UN Peacekeepers
were present in Rwanda to protect unarmed civilians against genocide.
Qaddafi on the other hand, was arguably fighting a civil war—
insufficient support for just cause.85
The initial measures, specifically UNSC Resolution 1973 and its
sanctions, were not allowed to fully take effect before NATO undertook
military intervention.86 “The intervention was not a last resort.
79. Rebecca J. Hamilton, The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine—But
What of Implementation?, 19 HARV. HUM RTS. J. 289 (2006) (showing inconsistent state practice
“precludes the development of customary law.”).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Libyan Intervention: A Victory for War?, PEACE POL’Y
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2011/10/05/the-libyan-intervention-a-victory-for-war/.
85. Id.
86. See Doebbler, supra note 10.
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Sanctions, including an arms embargo, had hardly been put in place
when the bombs began to fly.”87 Despite the Responsibility to Protect’s
requirement for fact-finding prior to turning to the “last resort,” i.e.
military intervention, NATO began its mission before definitive
evidence of Libya’s non-compliance had been proved.88 Libya invited
international monitors to visit their country, but this invitation was not
accepted.89 The “[f]act-finding mission by the UN Human Rights
Council and the Security Council [had] not yet gone to Libya” when
NATO began military action in March 2011.90
A. Political and Economic Interests in the Region
as Justification for Intervention: Oil and Lockerbie
According to Gareth Evans, several tests must be met to authorize
the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect.91 One such test is
making sure that the primary purpose for the “proposed military action
is to halt or avert the threat in question.”92 Evans claims that Libya
passed this test – if the primary motivator to intervene in Libya had
been regime change or oil, the Arab League or Security Council support
would never have been achieved.93 Yet many factors contradict Evans’
contention.
The Centre International de Recherches et d’Etudes sur La
Terrorisme & l’Aide au Victimes du Terrorisme94 Report (“CIRET –
AVT”) holds that because Libya is an oil rich country, NATO,
particularly the United States, has an interest in seeing a cooperative,
NATO-friendly regime in Libya.95 Libya possesses the largest oil
reserves in Africa and, before the uprising, was the world’s 12th largest
oil exporter, though mostly to European markets.96 Even in recent years,
87. O’Connell, supra note 84.
88. Doebbler, supra note 10.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Gareth Evans, Chancellor of the Austl. Nat’l Univ., Lecture on Law and Human Rights:
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Lessons and Challenges, (May 5, 2011), available at
http://www.gevans.org/index.html.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. “The International Center for Research and Studies on Terrorism and Aid of Terrorism
Victims.”
95. CENTRE INTERNATIONAL DE RECHERCHES ET D’ETUDES SUR LA TERRORISME &
L’AIDE AU VICTIMES DU TERRORISME REPORT, LIBYA: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE – REPORT ON A
FACT FINDING MISSION TO ASSESS BOTH SIDES OF THE LIBYAN CONFLICT (2011) [hereinafter
CIRET-AVT Report].
96. Alexander Belenky, Libya After Gaddafi Could Mean Good News for Obama, U.S.
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the United States has considered Qaddafi a quasi-ally, albeit a
potentially unreliable one. In 2004, President Bush negotiated with
Qaddafi to ensure the United States would have a stake in the portion of
Libya’s oil reserves that were previously unavailable to the U.S. oil
industry.97 To tap this reserve, President Bush lifted the economic
sanctions against Libya that had been in place since the 1988 Lockerbie
bombing.98
During the 1970s, Libya’s oil output had soared to three million
barrels a day.99 By 2004 this number decreased drastically to just about
1.5 million barrels a day.100 Qaddafi hoped that in exchange for his
promise to renounce nuclear weapons and terrorism, the introduction of
U.S. oil companies back into the region would lift Libya’s sagging oil
production.101 As time passed, it became clear that Qaddafi was not as
cooperative as the United States would have liked.102 In 2007, it became
evident that the Libyan leader was making a push for Libyan resource
nationalism—“Labor laws were amended to ‘Libyanize’ the economy,
and oil firms were pressed to hire Libyan managers, finance people and
human resources directors.”103 A U.S. State Department cable read:
“Those who dominate Libya’s political and economic leadership are
pursuing increasingly nationalistic policies in the energy sector that
could jeopardize efficient exploitation of Libya’s extensive oil and gas
reserves.”104
Tension continued to mount between the United States and
Qaddafi.105 In 2008, the U.S. Congress passed a bill that allowed easier
access to reparations for the surviving families of the Lockerbie
bombings.106 According to the State Department cable, Libya threatened

Economy, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2011), www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/23/libyagaddafi-obama-economy_n_933837.html.
97. Steven Mufson, Conflict in Libya: U.S. Oil Companies Sit on the Sidelines as Gaddafi
POST
(June
10,
2011),
Maintains
Hold,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/conflict-in-libya-us-oil-companies-sit-onsidelines-as-gaddafi-maintains-hold/2011/06/03/AGJq2QPH_story_2.html.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (noting that the U.S. passed a bill to make it easier for victims of the Lockerbie
Bombings to go after Libyan assets, making Qaddafi “livid”).
106. Id.
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to significantly curtail its oil production to penalize the United States.107
Oil prices began to creep upward, “which spiked globally in February
[2011] as the flow of oil from Libya dried to a trickle.”108 Indeed, this
posed problems for the oil dependent and ailing U.S. economy.109
Qaddafi’s decreased willingness to participate “efficiently” in oil
exportation became a significant motive for the United States and other
NATO allies to want Qaddafi expunged from Libya.110 With Qaddafi
gone, the country’s oil production could go back “online.”111
This strategy successfully led to a drop in the price of oil – “the
news of the rebels’ success [affected] Brent crude, which is used to
price many international oil varieties, dropping 92 cents.”112 With
President Obama’s approval rating suffering due to the economy,113 U.S.
involvement in the successful deposing of Qaddafi made an appealing
additive for the President’s political punch as the 2012 election neared.
In addition to the U.S. interest in Libya’s oil reserves, the United
States was concerned with China’s growing influence in the region.114
Further, because China had made significant investments in energy in
Libya, military intervention in Libya first provided an excuse to
evacuate the twenty-nine thousand Chinese who live there, and
secondly to ensure the replacement of China-friendly Qaddafi with a
new regime less favorable to China.115
For the UnitedStates, oil and financial gain were not the only
reasons to seek a new regime in Libya. The Libyan perpetrators of the
1988 Pan Am Flight bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland116 still remain
unpunished.117 In September 2011, four republican U.S. Senators visited
107. Id.
108. Belenky, supra note 96.
109. Id.
110. Mufson, supra note 97.
111. Belenky, supra note 96.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See China’s Evolving Foreign Policy: The Libyan Dilemma, ECONOMIST (Sept. 10,
2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21528664.
115. Id.
116. In 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 between London and New York was destroyed by a bomb
over Lockerbie, Scotland. After a protracted F.B.I. investigation, a Libyan intelligence official
was found responsible. Qaddafi’s lack of cooperation in punishing the official resulted in U.S.
sanctions against Libya. Time Line: The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/panam103/timeline.htm (last visited Feb.
15, 2013).
117. See Kareem Fahim & Rick Gladstone, U.S. Senate Delegation Offers Praise and
(Sept.
29,
2011),
Caution
to
Libya’s
New
Leaders,
N.Y.
TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/world/africa/senate-delegation-offers-praise-and-caution-to-
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the post-Qaddafi Libya and “raised the delicate subject of prosecuting”
the Lockerbie bombers.118
With its considerable influence, due to disproportionate financial
and human contributions to NATO military actions, these looming U.S.
interests were likely a driving force behind the decision to move past
initial coercive measures.119
B. Libya, but Not Syria, Bahrain, or Yemen
Some argue that the UNSC and NATO are inconsistent, even
hypocritical, in their application of the Responsibility to Protect.120
Continued “U.S. support of the Yemeni and Bahraini regimes as they
brutally suppress nonviolent pro-democracy protesters raises questions
as to why the U.S. [was] so quick to intervene militarily against the
Libyan regime suppressing an armed rebellion by those whose
commitment to democracy is more suspect.”121 Further, even as
Qaddafi’s regime was formally ended by his public death, and as his top
officials are now facing prosecution by the ICC,122 NATO’s Secretary
General announced in October 2011 that NATO had “[n]o intention
whatsoever” to enter Syria.123 Several factors have been cited as the
reasoning behind NATO’s decision to intervene in Libya and not Syria.
Director of research at the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar, Shadi
Hamid, opined that there is significantly more danger of the Syrian
regime causing trouble in the region.124 UNSC authorization is
inherently political in nature and the powerful member states have pull
libyas-new-leaders.html.
118. Id.
119. See CARL EK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30150, NATO COMMON FUNDS AND
BURDEN SHARING: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT RESEARCH SERVICE (2010), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142718.pdf.
120. Shadi Hamid, Is Intervening in Libya in American Interests? DEMOCRACY ARSENAL
(Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2011/03/is-intervening-in-libya-in-americaninterests.html.
121. Stephen Zunes, Libya, the ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ and Double Standards,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-zunes/libya-theresponsibility-_b_841168.html?.
122. Lead: Libya Says It Will Proseceute Gaddafi’s Son, Former Officials Eds: Adds Quotes
by Libyan Official, EUR. ONLINE MAG. (May 5, 2012), http://en.europeonline-magazine.eu/leadlibya-says-it-will-prosecute-gaddafis-son-former-officialseds-adds-quotes-by-libyanofficial_210428.html.
123. Brian Murphy, Syria: NATO Will Not Intervene, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/07/syria-nato-intervention_n_1000153.html.
124. Brian Murphy, Syria’s Risks Mute Talk of Libya Style Action, GUARDIAN (Oct. 7,
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9884472.
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when protecting their interests.125 Intervention in Syria is dangerous for
the United States becauswe anti-Western sentiment is easily spread in
the region.126 Well into 2012, Syria’s dictator Assad was still favored by
Russia and China and his downfall would be a blow to these countries’
interests in the Middle East.127 U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice,
alleged that Russia and China remain major arms dealers to Syria.128
Another reason NATO is reluctant to enter Syria with military
force comes from the fact that Qaddafi’s security forces fought for six
months despite “being hammered by NATO airstrikes,” thus
foreshadowing the possibility of a long, drawn-out, and expensive
intervention.129 Syria’s military is thought to be much stronger and more
cohesive than that of Libya and is armed with Russian-made weapons.130
Syria is different from Libya in that Libya’s rebel forces provided
a natural new regime, whereas in Syria, the political landscape is
splintered and thus could lead to more bloodshed.131 If Syria, with or
without intervention, “implodes, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan and potentially
Israel and Iraq would be infected” by the fallout.132 “The Arab League is
itself divided between Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which
support arming the rebels and toppling Assad, and others who fear that
ousting Assad would spark sectarian violence that spills over into
Lebanon and Iraq.”133 While some of this reasoning falls in line with the
factors considered under the Responsibility to Protect, such as the
balancing of consequences, other factors appear to have less to do with
protecting the population of Syria than with the political interests of
individual member states.
Other critics of the intervention in Libya argue that if the UNSC,
NATO, and member states are not willing or able to intervene in all
countries that need humanitarian protection and intervention, then it is
125. See Nancy Soderberg & David Bosco, The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in Syria and
Beyond, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/06/146474734/theworlds-responsibility-to-protect.
126. See id.
127. Murphy, supra note 123.
128. Edith M. Lederer, NATO Bombing in Libya Added to Syria Vetoes, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6,
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9883190.
129. Murphy, supra note 123.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Soderberg & Bosco, supra note 125.
133. Louis Charbonneau & Patrick Worsnip, U.N.-Arab League Syria Envoy Annan Has
Feb.
24,
2012,
available
at
Near-Impossible
Job,
REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/24/us-syria-un-annan-idUSTRE81N1XF20120224.
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best to stay out altogether, or risk being exposed as political and
economic opportunists. Non-intervention will preserve parties from
attack on a legal level as violators of international law and it will protect
the principle of state sovereignty.
Alternatively, there are strong arguments for intervention where
there is both political will and interest. It is better to do something in
one place, where a humanitarian crisis is under way, than to always
stand by helping no one.134 The embarrassment, pain, and political
consequence of doing nothing in Rwanda have convinced many to
support the uneven disbursement of humanitarian interventionist
forces.135 At this point, however, inconsistency is a hindrance to the
development of the Responsibility to Protect as a legal norm. Both the
international legal and political communities continue to find military
intervention for humanitarian purposes suspect.
V. IMPACT OF THE LIBYA INTERVENTION
A. The Libyan Intervention’s Impact on the UNSC’s Relevance
The UNSC’s relevance and position was seriously set back after
humanitarian intervention in countries like Kosovo.136 NATO’s exercise
of force without UNSC authorization weakened the UNSC authority
over such matters.137 In 2011, Resolution 1973 restored some of the
UNSC legitimacy as the gatekeeper and decision-making organ to
authorize the use of force in humanitarian crisis situations.138 Further,
for the Responsibility to Protect to gain ground in its efforts to achieve
status as internationally recognized legal doctrine, UNSC authorization
remains an essential step in establishing a foundation for congruence of
practice—a necessity for creating a legal norm.139
B. The Impact of the Libyan Intervention
on the Responsibility to Protect
Proponents of the intervention in Libya continue to argue that the
134. Hamid, supra note 120, at 1.
135. See id. at 2.
136. See INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT:
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000).
137. Id.
138. G.A. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
139. Jutta Brunnee and Stephen J. Toope, The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force:
Building Legality?, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 60, 77 (Alex
J. Bellamy, Sara E. Davies & Luke Glanville eds., 2011).
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measures taken by NATO and member states were justified under the
doctrine, despite evidence suggesting that the mission was really based
on political interest. At least with regard to Libya, NATO took the
correct measures by obtaining UNSC authorization before
intervention.140 However, India’s UN Ambassador, Hardeep Singh Puri,
recently noted, “Libya has given R2P a bad name.”141 The question
remains whether NATO and member states were able to stay within the
boundaries of acceptable practices in its intervention. “Many countries
that opposed the Security Council’s action, and even at least one that
supported it, now believe the Western operation [went] far beyond
merely protecting Libyans, and it is now widely being seen as an action
intended from the start to get rid of the Libyan ruler.”142 By October
2011, the United States dropped any pretense that participation in the
Libyan intervention was motivated by humanitarianism when U.S.
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, addressing Libyans during a visit to
the country, said that she hoped Qaddafi could be “captured or killed
soon” – a statement that many took to suggest that political
assassination was the intended outcome.143
Regardless of how unpopular Qaddafi might have been, “the idea
that NATO warplanes were trying to kill him struck a nerve . . . [with]
countries already suspicious of the responsibility-to-protect concept.”144
Getting rid of Qaddafi was outside the bounds of what proponents of the
Responsibility to Protect understood to be the goals or the plan of
NATO intervention.145 Gareth Evans claimed that eliminating the
Libyan dictator “was not part of the Security Council consensus.”146
To many in the international community, NATO’s arming of the
rebels and deposing of Qaddafi amounted not only to a violation of
Responsibility to Protect, but also of the UN Charter. While the desire
to prevent humanitarian atrocity underlies the Responsibility to Protect
doctrine, its façade is tarnished, making further UNSC Resolutions
140. See generally G.A. Res. 1973, supra note 138.
141. Philippe Bolopion, Op-Ed, After Libya, the Question: to Protect or Depose?, L.A. TIMES,
August 25, 2011, at A15, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/25/opinion/la-oebolopion-libya-responsibility-t20110825.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Libya: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Tripoli, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Oct. 18,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15349335.
145. Bolopion, supra note 141.
146. Jeffrey Laurenti, Syria Post-Libya: Testing the Responsibility to Protect, CENTURY
FOUND. (Jan. 19, 2012), http://tcf.org/blogs/botc/2012/01/syria-post-libya-testing-responsibilityto-protect.
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under the theory unlikely. The first legitimate attempt to implement the
Responsibility to Protect went too blatantly awry.147 If the
Responsibility to Protect in its current form and application retains a
foothold in the international community as the doctrine under which the
UNSC can authorize the use of force, then the exception to the use of
force under the UN Charter will not only be eviscerated but rendered
irrelevant.
C. The Impact of the Libyan Intervention on the UN Charter
and The Prohibition on the Use of Force
The UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force has been slowly
eroded for many years as the “two main Charter exceptions to the
prohibition to use force are not cast in iron language, but are subject to
evolving albeit not unlimited interpretations in response to new global
threats and changing needs of the international community.”148
Proponents of the idea that the prevention of human rights violations
and genocide are themselves jus cogens—thus providing a stronger
basis for institutionalizing the Responsibility to Protect - tout UNSCauthorized intervention in Libya as a victory for the concept, moving it
closer to acceptance as customary international law.149 This proposition
is inherently problematic given the manner in which the intervention
was undertaken. Outright acceptance of this proposition is a serious
threat to the jus cogens status of another highly valuable UN Charter
concept – the prohibition of the use of force.
Humanitarian intervention, and now the Responsibility to Protect,
is, on the surface, driven by the altruistic intentions of intervening
States. Neither, however, can be extricated from the competing and
prohibited intentions of those same States. In the instant case, the
prohibited intent rose to the surface and seized control of the
intervention. The United States’ fervent denial of regime change as the
objective of the Libya operation did not, and could not, last. The
international political importance of keeping those intentions buried was
trumped by domestic political strategy as the 2012 election approached;
Secretary Clinton herself chose to make a public showing of the U.S.
147. Martha Hall Findlay, Can Responsibility to Protect Survive Libya and Syria?, IPOLITICS
(Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.ipolitics.ca/2011/11/18/martha-hall-findlay-can-responsibility-toprotect-survive-libya-and-syria/; Philippe Bolopion, Op-Ed, After Libya, the Question: to Protect
TIMES,
Aug.
25,
2011,
at
A15,
available
at
or
Depose?,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/25/opinion/la-oe-bolopion-libya-responsibility-t20110825.
148. SCHRIJVER, supra note 18, at 44.
149. Evans, supra note 90.
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desire to get rid of the bad guy, thus illegitimating the humanitarian
purpose under which the use of force was originally authorized.150
Scholar Nico Schrijver warns, “if we are not careful, a question may
arise as to how long the prohibition to the use of force still qualifies to
be viewed as a jus cogens norm ‘accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted.’”151 Therefore, to prevent rendering the
Charter’s principle against the use of force irrelevant, it is necessary to
define boundaries on how Responsibility to Protect interventions are
executed.
VI. REMEDIES
Critics of NATO’s actions in Libya, rather than calling for critical
review and repercussions for these violations, ask politely that these acts
not become precedent for further expansion of the Charter’s exception
to the prohibition of the use of force.152 Thus, the UN Charter’s limits on
the use of force have finally been rendered toothless and there is no
incentive to fall within its bounds.153 Without specific recourse in the
form of remedy, a polite request to reconsider is not enough.154 For
states that have signed and ratified the Rome Statute, the International
Criminal Court is a potential option to investigate and implement a
remedy.155 Otherwise, to prevent this sort of violation in the future, the
responsibility remains with member states to authorize any forthcoming
resolutions where the use of force is under consideration.156

150. Libya: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Tripoli, supra note 144.
151. SCHRIJVER, supra note 18, at 39, 45.
152. Carsten Stahn, R2P, the ICC and the Libyan Arrests, HAGUE JUST. PORTAL (Nov. 24,
2011), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/smartsite.html?id=12998.
153. Justin Morris & Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and
the Use of Force, 44 INT’L POLITICS 214, 215 (2007), available at http://www.palgravejournals.com/ip/journal/v44/n2/pdf/8800185a.pdf.
154. See Stahn, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. U.N. Charter art. 39; U.N. Charter art. 42.
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A. Adjudication to Set Specific Boundaries for the Use
of Force: Several Opportunities
1. The ICC
a. Referral of Violating Countries Like Libya
to the ICC Prior to UNSC Authorization
In 2011, Libya and Qaddafi were referred to the ICC for
investigation and prosecution.157 This action was unprecedented, as
Libya is not a party to the Rome Statute.158 The UNSC, which is party to
the statute, referred Qaddafi and Libya’s government as violators of
international human rights law.159 This action represents a major step in
the development of the Responsibility to Protect into a doctrine of
international legal legitimacy. In their article, Stop the Killing, Michael
Contarino and Selena Lucent proposed that juridical process to analyze
whether Responsibility to Protect action is necessary, would serve both
a determination function and an action function:
[o]ver time, juridical R[esponsibility to Protect] determination could
produce a body of R[esponsibility to Protect] jurisprudence that
would clarify the bases for legal international interventions, and
thereby facilitate effective, legal enforcement actions. Such
jurisprudence, by clearly defining legal options, also would render
the illegal military interventions feared by R[esponsibility to Protect]
critics more difficult to justify. Accordingly, a juridical
R[esponsibility to Protect] determination mechanism might well
prove better able than the present system both to protect vulnerable
populations and discourage violations of the norm of peace by
nations using R[esponsibility to Protect] opportunistically and/or
160
unilaterally taking R[esponsibility to Protect] into their own hands.

Currently, calls to refer Syria to the ICC echo within the
international legal community.161 Through the powers and processes of
157. Stahn, supra note 149, at 1.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Michael Contarino & Selena Lucent, Stopping the Killing: The International Criminal
Court and Juridical Determination of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 193, 195–96 (Alex J. Bellamy, Sara E. Davies & Luke
Glanville eds., 2011).
161. Al Arabiya with Agencies, U.N. Lists War Crimes Suspects in ‘Leadership Positions,’
AL ARABIYA NEWS (Feb. 18, 2013), http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/02/18/266954.html;
Iveta Cherneva, How to Get Assad, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., (Apr. 4, 2012)
http://www.fletcherforum.org/2012/04/04/how-to-get-assad/. While UNSC authorization of the
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the ICC, the Responsibility to Protect can be strengthened and tamed
into a potentially safe, effective, and legal method to combat
humanitarian crisis.
b. ICC Prosecution of War Crimes to Serve as Deterrent for NATO
In order to solidify the boundaries of the Responsibility to Protect
and prevent the “mission creep” that turns humanitarian action into
regime change, serious ICC investigation and possible prosecution of
any war crimes by NATO in Libya would establish legitimate
repercussions, something that many critics of international law say is
frequently lacking.162 With no enforcement or remedial mechanism, the
Responsibility to Protect tenets carry little force. Libya presents an
opportunity to legitimize and set true boundaries on the implementation
of the Responsibility to Protect.
An ICC investigation could be a tool to do just that. NATO
officials “say that between March and October NATO warplanes flew
twenty-six thousand sorties, including more than 9,600 strike missions,
destroying more than one thousand tanks, vehicles, and guns, as well as
buildings claimed to have housed ‘command and control’ centers.”163
Targeted facilities included Qaddafi’s “heavily fortified compound in
Tripoli, [and] also residential homes of his supporters - targets which
could be considered outside the UN mandate.”164 Currently, NATO
meets suggestions that it investigate these issues with an air of willing
cooperation.165 Friction is likely, however, because individual Member
States that participated in the air strikes have called the allegations
“libel.”166 ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo faces political pressure
to avoid opening a formal investigation and speaks of a potential
investigation with caution and diplomacy.167 Despite political pressures
and distinct repercussions that certain member states face if formally
investigated and prosecuted, standing up to such forces presents an
opportunity to effect international use of force law in an important
use of force and referral to the ICC seem to go hand in hand, perhaps they are not mutually
exclusive given the extremity of the current situation and Russia’s new distance from Assad.
Further, alternatives for the exercise of ICC jurisdiction do exist.
162. Mike Corder and Slobodan Lekic, NATO Fears War Crimes Investigation By World
Court, MSNBC (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45252513/ns/world_newseurope/t/nato-fears-libya-war-crimes-investigation-world-court.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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manner.
The threat of repercussions for member states that violate law in
the course of military intervention would instill legitimacy in the
Responsibility to Protect. Thus, any headway made by the
Responsibility to Protect towards becoming a norm of international law
would pose less of a threat to the principles behind the UN Charter,
making the Responsibility to Protect a more palatable exception to the
prohibition against the use of force.
NATO is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, therefore
prosecution by the ICC would be geared toward member state
signatories.168 ICC jurisdiction and subsequent punishment is only
applicable to those who have signed and ratified the Rome Statute,
leaving certain member states, e.g., the United States, technically free
from submission to its jurisdiction.169 Yet, prosecution of sister states
may still have an influence on countries that have an interest in abiding
by, or appearing to abide by, similar standards. With the United States’
newfound warmth toward the ICC, this threat could nonetheless have a
deterrent effect.170
2. The ICJ
The ICJ, the United Nations judicial organ under UN Charter
Article 92, is arguably the appropriate venue for review of UNSC
resolutions.171 As with the U.S. Constitution, the UN Charter does not
enumerate judicial review.172 Yet in the United States, the concept and
practice of judicial review was legitimized by case law and has a longstanding precedent.173 Traditionally, much tension has existed between
the UNSC and the ICJ, as judicial review has not been formally
incorporated as a concept as it has been in the United States.174 Given
that the two bodies of the UN have occasionally overlapping functions,
168. Id.
169. Factsheet: Ratification/Accession and Signature on the Agreement of the Privileges and
Immunities of the Court (APIC), by Region, COALITION INT’L CRIM. CT. (2012),
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/APIC_EN_chart_updated_January_2012.pdf.
170. See Harold Koh & Stephen Rapp, U.S. Engagement with the ICC and the Outcome of
the Recently Concluded Review Conference, U.S. DEPT. STATE (June 15, 2010),
http://m.state.gov/md143178.htm.http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/143178.htm.
171. See U.N. Charter, article 92.
172. Aditya Krishnamurthy, The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Judicial Review By the ICJ,
http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/lock.htm, LEGALSERVICEINDIA.COM (last visited Oct.
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any advisory ruling by the ICJ on a UNSC resolution may be met with
skepticism and highlight the Court’s lack of authority.175
In the Lockerbie bombing case, the ICJ ruled, “judicial review is
an evolutionary process.”176 Still, the court declined to exercise judicial
review of UNSC Resolutions 731177 and 748178 (the former requested
Libya’s compliance regarding the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and
the latter instituted sanctions on Libya). The ICJ is nonetheless “a
‘court’ charged with interpretation of ‘law,’” and is thus an appropriate
mechanism from which to seek guidance in requesting an advisory
opinion on issues such as whether the UNSC’s Resolution 1973 and
NATO’s subsequent actions in Libya were lawful.179
The ICJ is charged with applying international customary law
in its decisions:180
Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the ICJ is
bound to decide cases “in accordance with international law” and to
apply “international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law.” Customary law “owes its legal form to its
acceptance as law by the international community.” Its application
has frequently required the Court to look to “proof of the pertinent
contemporary international [community] standard.” It is important to
note in this respect that the classical definition of customary law has
evolved from the traditional concept of the behavior of states to
include the behavior of organizations, like the United Nations, that
181
are composed of states.

With this in mind, a finding that NATO’s actions in Libya under
Resolution 1973, as part of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine,
qualifies as customary international law is unlikely given that, in its
current form, the Responsibility to Protect was essentially untested
before 2011. That is, no precedent exists. The ramifications of such a
decision are unknown. An ICJ advisory opinion may however serve to
sharpen the requirements and expectations of any further military course
of action under the same or similar pretense, and ensure that the action
175. See Kathleen Renee Cronin-Furman, The International Court of Justice and The United
Nations Security Council: Rethinking a Complicated Relationship, 106 COL. L. REV. 435, 447 R.
(2006).
176. Krishnamurthy, supra note 168.
177. S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731, at 52 (Jan. 31, 1992).
178. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748, at 52-4 (Mar. 31, 1992).
179. Krishnamurthy, supra note 168.
180. Cronin-Furman, supra note 171, at 455-456.
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complies more closely to the provisions of the UN Charter.
B. The UNSC Veto
The veto power of the five permanent members of the UNSC
provides a built-in safeguard to “reduce many unnecessary conflicts in
international relations.”182 A veto by any of the permanent members
prevents UNSC authorization of the use of force, while an abstention
does not.183 For example, in 2007, China and Russia voted against a
resolution that “characterized the situation in Burma as constituting ‘a
threat to international peace and security,’” blocking implementation of
the Responsibility to Protect.184 The ICISS’s report on the
Responsibility to Protect calls upon the permanent five members of the
Security Council to refrain from exercising their veto power “in matters
where its vital state interests are not involved,” if their veto would
obstruct the passage of resolutions that authorize military humanitarian
intervention for which there is otherwise majority support.185 While
there is no legal restriction on the use of the veto power with regard to
the Responsibility to Protect, the request that members abstain rather
than veto, attempts to restrict the veto power by placing “political and
moral pressure on the five permanent members.”186
The passage of UNSC Resolution 1973 was unobstructed by China
and Russia, both of whom chose to abstain rather than to exercise their
veto power, perhaps under this “political and moral pressure.”187 For a
time, it appeared that China’s growing world power suggested that its
status as “persistent objector” to humanitarian intervention might be a
thing of the past as it is no longer in danger of intervention on its own
soil.188 Yet China’s unwillingness to allow passage of a resolution to
authorize the use of force in Syria suggests that China’s role as objector
remains active. Libya arguably served as a test case for the objectors,
China and Russia, wherein they allowed intervention to move forward
182. See Yao Huang, On the Military Intervention Under the Doctrine of the Responsibility to
SOC’Y
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CHINESE
http://a10014931063.oinsite.cn/web/errors/404.aspx?aspxerrorpath=/_d271634455.htm
(last
visited Mar. 16, 2013). Huang discusses international legal theory over the last ten years, the R2P,
and its influence on the collective coercive measures of the U.N. security system.
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186. Huang, supra note 182, at 10.
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Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 277–82 (2011).
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despite concern that the intervention would be used to advance political
interests and violate state sovereignty.189
The stage was set for the Responsibility to Protect to gain
legitimacy, yet given how the intervention played out, it was the
importance and purpose of the veto that was reinforced.190 The veto is
one of few measures that can prevent the Responsibility to Protect from
being used as a tool for an individual State to “pursue its selfinterests.”191 Thus, reclaiming the veto power as such a safeguard is one
way to insist that thinly guised political agendas that destabilize the true
intent of the Responsibility to Protect do not prevail again.192
VII. CONCLUSION
The future of the UN Charter’s prohibition against the use of force
is precarious. To interventionists in the United States and Europe,
intervention in Libya under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine was
considered a success - moving the Responsibility to Protect closer to
becoming a norm of international law.193 Yet the fact still remains that
NATO’s actions in Libya contradicted the UN Charter’s prohibition
against the use of force to intervene in what most say was a civil war.194
While many recognize a responsibility to protect, mission creep
subsumed the humanitarian objective.195 Despite the humanitarian
principle that theoretically supported the intervention, political agendas
were not adequately separated from the altruistic goal.196 Calling an
intervention “humanitarian” does not transform the action to one that
meets the standards of international legality.
History once again challenges the precepts and functionality of
international law as the situation in Syria worsens. The lessons learned
from Libya have not yet been fully processed and the international
community now faces pressure to throw aside a doctrine it has fought to
invest with legal legitimacy.197 As of February 2013, the civilian death

189. See Chris Keeler, The End of the Responsibility to Protect?, FOREIGN POL’Y J. (Oct. 12,
2012), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/10/12/the-end-of-the-responsibility-to-protect/.
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191. Huang, supra note 182, at 28.
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toll approaches seventy thousand.198 Two Western journalists have been
killed.199 In February 2012, reports of Iranian war boats docked in
Syrian ports and the possibility of nuclear capability in Iran came from
the region.200 Political hackles are raised from Israel to the United States
and back to China. As matters progress in Syria, it becomes clear that
what the West construes as “humanitarianism” in Syria is fraught with
potential disaster on a global scale.201 Executive Director of the Global
Center for the Responsibility to Protect Simon Adams says, “[i]f Libya
showed us how far we’ve come, then Syria has shown us how far we
have to go.”202 Others call for relinquishing the “desperate
triumphalism” of the pro-Libyan interventionist and “come to grips with
their pyrrhic victory in Libya.”203
For the Responsibility to Protect to maintain any ground it may
have gained with the Libyan intervention, it is necessary for NATO to
receive UNSC authorization prior to intervening.204 Yet UNSC
authorization of even a watered down resolution with regard to Syria is
a near impossibility.205 Until December 2012, when Russia publicly
distanced itself from Assad,206 Russia and China remained firmly
positioned against any kind of intervention in Syria and thrice vetoed a
resolution that called for an end to Assad’s violence.207 Brazil, India,
South Africa and Lebanon abstained in the second UNSC vote and
198. Ashley Fantz, Syria Death Toll Probably at 70,000, U.N. Human Rights Official Says,
CNN
(Feb.
13,
2013),
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/02/12/world/meast/syria-deathtoll/index.html?hpt=hp_t1.
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Intervention, COUN. ON FOREIGN REL. (July 21, 2012), blogs.cfr.org/Patrick/2012/06/12/rip-forr2p-syria-and-the-dilemmas-of-humanitarian-intervention/#cid=.
202. Jacob Mundy, It’s Official: Syria is in a State of Civil War. Or Is It? E-INT’L REL. (June
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Neil MacFarquhar, Syria Denies Attack on Civilians, in Crisis Seen as Civil War, N.Y. TIMES,
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South Africa and Pakistan abstained in the July 2012 vote, indicating a
“major divide within the Security Council.”208 The UNSC’s failure to
pass the resolutions “is directly related to the actions of the NATO-led
intervention in Libya, during which the United States and its allies
overtly overstepped the UN mandate authorizing action.”209
With Chinese and Russian interests strong in Syria and the bad
taste lingering in the wake of intervention in Libya, it does not appear
that the Responsibility to Protect in its imagined form will be the
mechanism through which intervention in Syria will be initiated.210
“Security Council deadlock and buyer’s remorse among UN member
states have led some to suggest that R[eponsibility to Protect] is
dead.”211 The vetoed resolution before the UNSC did not rise to the level
of actually authorizing the use of force, yet the vetoing members took a
strong stand against what they believe to be a slippery slope that
inevitably leads to the use of force.212 Originally, it was argued that
China and Russia’s vetoes were premature and prevented Syria from
receiving humanitarian aid that was needed immediately.213
Responsibility to Protect proponents wished that Russia and China
would simply abstain and get out of the way. However, with the Red
Cross’ July 2012 announcement that Syria is in a state of civil war,
Russia and China, who tout state sovereignty as a reason to veto the
UNSC resolutions, are arguably vindicated under international law.214
To many, the vetoes point to a functioning UNSC system and will
prevent what happened in Libya from happening in Syria.
As the “civil war” rages on in Syria, intervention will now largely
be determined by an analysis of the declaration of civil war and whether
it forecloses legal international intervention by virtue of the sovereignty
argument or whether this particular civil war constitutes a threat to
peace and security in the region, thus making intervention permissible
under the UN Charter’s exception.215 With Syria in a state of civil war,
a broader range of international humanitarian law applies.216 However, a
208. Id.
209. Patrick, supra note 201.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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collapse of the Assad regime arguably threatens “peace and security” in
the region to a much larger degree, with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and
Palestine all having major interests in the outcome.217
Evidence of the disturbance of peace and security in the region
was solidified on August 15, 2012, when an abduction of more than
twenty Syrians occurred within Lebanese territory. Their captors called
the incident “revenge for the kidnapping of a Lebanese relative by
rebels inside Syria.”218 Further, the United Nations refugee agency
reported that the more than 857,712 refugees registered or awaiting
registration in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and North Africa
are overwhelming relief efforts.219 Thus, it seems that obituaries for the
Responsibility to Protect are “premature.”220 From this standpoint, it is
arguable that the Russian and Chinese vetoes no longer point to a
functioning UNSC system but rather symbolize a closely held political
agenda that stands in the way of an intervention deserving of legal
support.
Now it is up to the international community to find a politically
and legally acceptable way to provide Syria with some humanitarian
relief.221 This need not signal an end to the Responsibility to Protect if
the international community can refrain from pursuing intervention
without UNSC authorization—a goal which may simply be too lofty.222
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If NATO decides, as it has done in the past, to use force without
authorization, the Responsibility to Protect might as well be discarded
as a possible legal norm. The UN Charter’s prohibition faces a similar
fate—one of much greater consequence.
The tide of history moves quickly forward. The UN Charter and its
principles, stand as foundational pilings. They have taken a beating. An
interval of calm to repair and reinforce would be convenient; yet, that is
not what history allows. Now, despite the current climate, it is more
important than ever to use the tools that law has set out to reinforce
those principles. The veto, as used by UNSC member states, is one such
tool. Review of Resolution 1973 by the ICJ should commence, as
should an investigation of NATO’s actions in Libya by the ICC. The
pressure to make quick decisions about Syria should not prevent the
repair and improvements that need to be undertaken to ensure that
future interventions conform to international law. These measures are
necessary to reinforce the legitimacy of the principles of the UN Charter
and international legal order. Without such action, we risk being swept
up by the immediacy of perceived humanitarian crisis, and those
foundational pilings may not weather another storm.
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